Abstract: Why economic performance and macroeconomic stability has differed among the BRICs countries? More specifically, in which way macroeconomic policy regime and the management of the economic policy has defined an economic environment that has contributed for a higher (or lower) economic performance and macroeconomic stability in the BRICs countries? The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between exchange rate regime, capital account convertibility and economic performance within the big emerging countries that constitute what has been called BRIC -Brazil, Russia, India and China. The hypothesis of the paper is that economic performance of BRICs countries is the result, at least partially, of the quality of the macroeconomic policy management adopted in each country, in which exchange rate policy, capital account convertibility and the degree of external vulnerability plays a key role.
Introduction
In October 2003, a Goldman and Sachs' report (Purushothaman and Wilson, 2003) , using the demographic projections and a model of capital accumulation and productivity growth, mapped out GDP growth, income per capita and currency movements of the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) until 2050. Based in some assumptions, the report forecasted that in less than 40 years the BRICs countries together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms and by 2025 they could account for over half for the size of the G6 (currently they are worth less than 15%). However, as the report recognizes, there is no guarantee that the economic growth of these countries will reach what is forecasted by the study, as such behaviour depends on a set of factors, which includes macro stability (understood as price stability), development of good institutions (legal system, functioning markets, educational systems, financial institutions etc.), openness to trade and FDI, and improvement in education degree of the population -a very known development policies supported by multilateral institutions, such as World Bank.
Although such sort of forecast is exposed to criticism, there is no doubt that due to their geographic and population size and GDP dimension (current and potential), in spite of the problems of social inequality and even poverty that the BRICs countries face nowadays, one cannot disregard the importance and potentiality of theses economies. Looking at the GDP growth performance of the BRICs countries, since 1990, one can see that GDP growth has differed among the countries: average GDP growth in China in 1990-2006 was 9.8%, in India 6.1%, Brazil 2.2% and Russia -0.1%.
If we compare the BRICs countries only in the recent period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , that is after the 1998's Russian crisis, the economic performance changes somehow: 9.3% in China, 6.8% in India, 6.7% in Russia and 2.8% in Brazil. Why economic performance and macroeconomic stability 1 has differed among the BRICs countries? More specifically, in which way macroeconomic policy regime and the management of the economic policy has defined an economic environment that has contributed for a higher (or lower) economic performance and macroeconomic stability of the BRICs countries?
The paper aims at analyzing the relationship between exchange rate regime, capital account convertibility and economic performance within the big emerging 1 For the purpose of this paper, we define macroeconomic stability as a broader concept than just price stabilization, as it aims to reduce the uncertainties that are intrinsic to the business world in order to provide a favourable environment for investment and production decisions. Macroeconomic stability can also be defined as a situation of sustained economic growth with financial stability, that is with inflation under control and with low likehood of financial/currency crises. See more, on this subject, in Oreiro and Paula(2007, section 2) .
countries that constitute what has been called BRIC -Brazil, Russia, India and China, during the period of capital account liberalisation that has happened in broader terms since beginning of the 1990s. The main hypothesis developed in the paper is that economic performance of BRICs countries is the result, at least partially, of the quality of the macroeconomic policy management adopted in each country, in which exchange rate policy, capital account convertibility and the degree of external vulnerability play a key role.
The paper is divided in three sections, besides the Introduction. Section 2 discusses the relationship between capital account convertibility, exchange rate regime and macroeconomic stability in emerging countries, while section 3 focuses the analysis on the recent experience of each BRIC country. Section 4 compares briefly such experiences and seeks to extract some conclusions.
Exchange rate regimes, capital controls and macroeconomic stability
One important discussion in the literature about macroeconomic issues in emerging countries is which exchange rate regime is more appropriate for these countries. On one hand, according to the 'bipolar' view intermediary regimes -that involve all sorts of intermediary exchange rate regimes, that is between freely floating regime and fixed exchange rate regime -are less appropriate for economies with substantial involvement in international capital markets. The main argument is that such exchange rate regimes make countries more vulnerable to speculative attacks (Fischer, 2001 ). On the other hand, the view called 'fear of floating' points out that many emerging countries that adopt flexible exchange rate regime in practice seek to limit exchange rate movements. Such resistance to floating arises from their low policy and institutional credibility and high degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes into domestic prices, among other factors (Calvo and Reihart, 2002) . Other reasons to why monetary authorities avoid exchange rate movements are related to the effects of excessive exchange rate volatility (mainly devaluation) on the outstanding foreign currency debts of banks and the corporate sectors with unhedged foreign currency liabilities. In addition, exchange rate fluctuations may generate uncertainties that could impede trade. For instance, prolonged real appreciation associated with large capital inflows can adversely affect export competitiveness and investment in the external sector.
Fixed exchange regime has the advantage of eliminating the exchange rate risk that affects the decisions of exporters and importers and domestic borrowers in international financial markets, and also converging domestic inflation to external inflation. However, such regime has also high risks for bigger emerging countries, as its results in the lost of economic policy flexibility to face external shocks, mainly when economic authorities does not have enough exchange reserves to intervene in the exchange market and/or there is a confidence crisis associated to the lack of government capability in maintaining the pegged exchange rate; under these conditions, the adjustment costs can be very high. Fixed exchange rate may encourage borrowers to be too confident in taking out foreign-exchange-denominated loans, doing very painful any change in the exchange rate regime.
2
One could argue that the adoption of a freely flexible exchange regime by emerging countries could isolate these countries from speculative attacks on domestic currency as government has no commitment with any level of exchange rate. Besides, floating exchange regime could increase the autonomy of monetary policy, overcoming the 'impossible trinity' that says that a country cannot have at the same time capital account convertibility, fixed exchange rate regime and monetary policy autonomy in order to achieve domestic objectives. However, floating exchange regime frequently works in the real world differently from what is supposed in the textbooks. According to Grenville (2000) , fundamentals cannot explain the behaviour of exchange rate over a short/medium term horizon, that is exchange rate have at times exhibited long-lived swings with no apparent changes in fundamentals significant enough to justify them.
The problems related to the exchange rate volatility are greater for emerging countries, as they have: (i) no long historical experience of market-determined exchange rate; (ii) few Friedmanite stabilizers speculators acting in the exchange market, that is there has been a lack of players willing take contrarian foreign exchange positions in emerging countries; and (iii) much larger and volatile capital flows, in relation to the size of their capital markets and economies more generally (Grenville, 2000) . According to Ho and McCauley's data (2003) , despite of the rapid growth in activity during the 1990s, 2 Mohanty and Scatigna (2005,p.19) , using the IMF's de facto classification of exchange rate regimes report that the number of emerging countries opting for a flexible exchange rate has risen from a little above 15% in 1990 to about one half at the end of 2001, while the share of hard peg regimes increased moderately from under 10% at little above 15% during the same period, and intermediate regime has fallen from over three quarters to less than 35%. Reihart and Rogoff (2002) , however, using another classification based on parallel exchange market activity and other special features, concluded that many emerging economies have in effect crawling peg regimes.
foreign exchange markets in most emerging countries continue to be relatively small and less liquidity than their counterparts in the industrial world. This suggests that emerging foreign exchange markets are more prone to one-sided bets and instability, because they are thin and subject to a high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetries (Moreno, 2005, p.10) .
Flexibility in the operation of floating exchange regimes can be helpful in absorbing the capital inflow, in buffering external shocks, and responding to the changing productive capacity of emerging economies; it can also inhibit some shortterm flows, by serving as a constant reminder that exchange rate volatility can outweigh the interest rate advantage of foreign currency borrowings (Grenville, 2000, p.59) .
Some sort of managed floating exchange rates regime can be useful if the objective of the central bank is to reduce the exchange rate volatility and also influence somehow the real exchange rate for international trade purposes. Central bank intervenes in foreign exchange markets to achieve a variety of macroeconomic objectives, such as controlling inflation, maintaining external competitiveness and/or maintaining financial stability.
Differently from a pegged exchange rate, authorities' interventions to limit exchange rate movements may not target a certain level of the exchange rate, allowing nominal exchange rate to float in order to disincentivise speculative capital flows but may influence its path. (Epstein et al, 2003, p.6-7) . Capital controls can be used for different sometimes related objectives, such as (i) to reduce the vulnerability of a country to financial crises, including capital flight during any currency crisis; (ii) to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates in order to provide monetary authorities with some policy autonomy at least in the short-run; (iii) to maintain some short-term stability of nominal exchange rate and to reduce exchange rate pressures derived from excessive capital inflows. For this purpose capital controls can be used to change the composition and maturity structure of flows (towards longer maturity flows) and to enhance monetary authorities' ability to act in the exchange foreign market.
Although the effectiveness of capital controls are very controversial 6 , evidence suggests that the macroeconomic benefits of capital management techniques can outweigh the microeconomic costs as show some recent experiences. Magud and Reihart (2006) review more than 30 papers that evaluated capital controls either on inflows or outflows around the world (the evaluation excludes countries with comprehensive capital controls, such as China and India), making use of a capital controls effectiveness index in order to standardize the results of the empirical studies.
They conclude that "capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of capital flow; reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evidence is more controversial)", but "seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and hence, the current account balance)" (Magud and Reihart, 2006, p.26) , while "limiting private external borrowing in the 'good times' plays an important prudential role because more often than not countries that are 'debt intolerant'" (Magud and Reihart, 2006, p.26-7) . In the same connection Ho and McCauley (2003, p.34) concludes that "recent experience has shown that capital controls, if properly designed and applied, can be helpful in protecting the economy against the desestabilising aspects 5 Prudential controls can include: (i) to limit the opportunities for residents to borrow in foreign currency and to monitor them when they do, and (ii) to keep very tight constraints on banks' ability to have open foreign exchange positions or indirect exposure through foreign exchange loans. 6 Criticism on capital controls are partially related to the possible benefits of capital account liberalisation, that are: increased opportunities for risk diversification, a higher efficiency of global allocation of savings, and external discipline on domestic macroeconomic policies (Fisher, 1998) . However, empirical evidence of capital account liberalisation upon economic performance is ambiguous while their links with financial crises are quite evident. Economists of IMF (Prasad et al, 2003, p. 3) resume the empirical findings of the literature: "a systematic examination of the evidence suggests that is difficult to establish a robust causal relationship between the degree of financial integration and output growth performance". 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 interest rates lower than the former period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) BCB's reaction to exchange rate movements has caused frequently a decline in output and employment, increasing at the same time the volume of public debt (Table 1) . More recently, favoured by the benign international environment, BCB has gradually reduced short-term interest rate. Capital flows legislation in Brazil was introduced in the 1960s, according to which foreign capital flows should be registered in order to obtain permission for associated outflows (profits, interests, royalties, and repatriation). Since the end of the 1980s it can be noted an increasing trend towards capital account liberalisation in Brazil. Early 1990s foreign direct investment (FDI) was further liberalised as prohibition on FDI into certain sectors was lifted and bureaucratic obstacles were reduced. In 1991 Brazilian government permitted the acquisition by foreign institutional investors of equities of domestic firms. In 1992 BCB allowed a broad liberalisation of capital outflows as it permitted that a special non-resident account called CC5 could be operated more freely by foreign financial institutions as a result of acquisition or sale of foreign currencies. This exception created a privileged way to short-term capital flight that was used very often during periods of speculation attacks on domestic currency and represented the introduction of de facto convertibility, as in practice residents could deposit in a non-resident bank's account held in a domestic bank, that could convert domestic into foreign currency: residents could transfer resources abroad making these deposits and asking the non-resident financial institution to buy foreign currency to make deposit in an account abroad 10 . In April 1994 Brady Plan converted the external loans into debt securities, helping to overcome the external debt crisis that had contributed somehow to the 'stagflation' environment of Brazil since 1981. In 1994 BCB implemented a financial transaction tax 11 and increased the minimum maturity requirements for capital inflows in order to reduce upward pressure on the exchange rate, to minimise the cost of sterilisation and to give some freedom degree for monetary policy. 12 At the same time, measures aimed to stimulate outflows -including the permission for prepayment of foreign borrowing and import finance -were also adopted. (Selic) and capital controls is negative, so that an increase (decrease) the former should result in the reduction (increase) in the interest rate; (ii) nominal exchange rate does not respond to the variations in the capital controls, what suggests that there is no evidence that capital controls generate an increase the exchange rate volatility, a hypothesis suggested by some Brazilian economists (Arida, 2004 ).
As we have seen, during the period of semi-pegged exchange rate regime BCB defined the nominal exchange rate inside a narrow band; after the 1999 devaluation of the real (Brazilian currency), however, BCB has had no commitment to determine exchange rate (both nominal and real), although it has operated occasionally in the exchange foreign markets in periods of greater capital flows volatility and more recently according to its policy to accumulate exchange reserves 14 . Therefore, Brazilian exchange rate regime is not a freely floating exchange regime, as BCB eventually intervenes in foreign exchange market, but it is closer to a floating exchange regime than other emerging countries. Since end of 2002 real exchange rate has had an overvaluated trend due to both increase of trade surplus and capital flows. The latter has been attracted by high yield differentials between domestic and foreign bonds. As can be seen in Figure 7 , the resumption of capital flows was dominated by portfolio investment (equity and debt securities) until 1997, while the decline in the capital flows was commanded by portfolio investments and other investments 15 . Portfolio investments have played a crucial role in the large capital flow swings associated with the financial crisis. Since 1998 FDI has prevailed as the main source of capital flows.
According to ECLAC (2000, p.35-6) , Brazil was since 1996 the second-largest destination for FDI among developing countries, although as can be seen in Figure 7 the volume of FDI has declined more recently. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 international bonds -public debt has been more or less in the same level despite of the fiscal primary surplus.
Russia
Russia, from 1990 to 2006, had on average a negative economic growth of minus 0.1%. However, if we divide the Russian economy growth in two periods, that is before and after the 1998 Russian crisis, we have quite different periods: while from 1990 until 1998 GDP real growth accumulated a fall of around 45%, the average GDP growth from 1999 until 2006 -6.7% -did performed well. Figure 8 presents the behaviour of GDP growth in Russia in 1990-2006 period. After the 1998 Russian financial crisis the rebound of the economy has been faster and stronger than anyone could predicted. Indeed, recent Russian economic performance corresponds closely to the notion of a 'growth acceleration', as defined by Hausmann et al (2004) , that is at least eight years of sustainable economic growth. 1 9 9 2 q 0 3 1 9 9 3 q 0 2 1 9 9 4 q 0 1 1 9 9 4 q 0 4 1 9 9 5 q 0 3 1 9 9 6 q 0 2 1 9 9 7 q 0 1 1 9 9 7 q 0 4 1 9 9 8 q 0 3 1 9 9 9 q 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 4 q 0 4 1 9 9 5 q 0 3 1 9 9 6 q 0 2 1 9 9 7 q 0 1 1 9 9 7 q 0 4 1 9 9 8 q 0 3 1 9 9 9 q 0 2 2 0 0 0 According to Owen and Robinson (2003, p.25-26) , the seeds of the 1998
Russian financial crisis were related to some economic unbalances: a large budget deficit (7.4% of GDP in 1996) arising from the government inability to collect taxes and contain expenditure; a large short-term domestic debt; the lack of structural reform in banking, natural monopoly, and agricultural sectors. The initial output collapse that followed the August 1998 crisis in Russia was not as deep as in most other crisis countries and recovery was quicker and stronger than other crisis countries due to a set factors that include: (i) import substitution stimulated by large exchange rate depreciation; (ii) the fact that channels through shocks are generally transmitted to the real economy in crisis situations were less relevant in the case of Russia than in other emerging market economies, as private sector wealth was largely held outside the banking sector, and relatively few enterprises had significant foreign currency liabilities not matched by foreign currency income streams; and (iii) the positive terms of trade change from rising oil prices gave a further boost to the economy from mid-1999, and allowed a quick recovery of international reserves (Owen and Robinson, 2003, p.7-9) . Furthermore, Central Bank of Russia (CBR) acted quickly to address the problems in the banking sector, improving rapidly liquidity situation of the banks, what avoided general run on deposits and at the same time enhanced the payments system.
As we have already stressed, growth performance after the Russian crisis has been strong contrasting with the pre-crisis period. By 2000 high oil prices -the average oil price increased from US$ 12,8 in 1998 to US$ 28,4 in 2000 -contributed to a quick rise in investment rate of the economy (Table 2) . Furthermore, the rise of aggregate demand also contributed to boost economic growth, favoured by the increase in both pensions and wages, the increase of net exports, and the decline of interest rates due to the adoption of a more expansionary monetary policy (Figure 12 ), that has stimulated the increase of banking credit, from 12% of GDP in 1999 to 22% in 2003 (IMF, 2004, p. 10) . Energy sector has direct impact on output growth, as it contributes about 20% of GDP, and indirectly as it pushes other industrial sector (such as construction and machinery). However, the economic recovery was broad-based as large real exchange rate depreciation in late 1998 provided a strong boost to the competitiveness of the tradable sector which was translated into a surge in the output in many sectors of the economy (Owen and Robinson, 2003, p.51) . (Figure 11 ). The combination of a prolonged period of high world energy prices with some capital account surplus has generated a real exchange rate trend, that has gradually returned to its pre-crisis level, despite of the efforts of CBR to attenuate this trend ( Figure 10 ). As nominal exchange rate has been stable, due to the active performance of CBR in the foreign exchange market, the bulk of real appreciation took the form of a persistently high inflation differential. The continued real appreciation, although partly neutralised by productivity gains, has raised the risk of 'Dutch disease' that can reduce the efforts of diversification of the Russia's production and export structure -a current concern of the Russian government. Russia have adopted after the 1998 crisis an administered floating exchange regime, under a context of capital account partially convertibility. CBR has pursued multiple objectives, avoiding an unnecessarily tight monetary policy for fear of slowing output growth. The main goal of the CBR has been to accumulate reserves and to prevent overly rapid real exchange rate appreciation, by maintaining nominal effective exchange rate stable, in an effort to preserve the competitiveness of manufacturing sector, and also to smooth the path of exchange-rate adjustment, while guiding down inflation has been an important, but secondary, objective.
18 Inflation, though still high, has continued to edge downwards each year despite relatively lax monetary conditions ( Figure 13 ). The decline in inflation reflects the effect of REER appreciation, reduced duties on importation of beef above quota, lower increase in administered prices, and a cap on petroleum prices. 
India
India, after years of low economic growth and after facing a financial crisis in 1991, has had a dramatic change in economic growth: the real GDP growth was on 20 There are some concerns about this announcement, although Russian domestic interest rate settings have remained below those available in other emerging countries, what should reduce speculation related to interest rate arbitrage. 21 The Oil Stabilisation Fund (OIF) was created in 2004 with the objective of reducing the impact of fluctuations of oil prices on the resources available to the budget. 'Surplus' revenues resulting from relatively high oil prices are accumulated in the Fund automatically: 95% of the income from the natural resource extraction tax and 100% of the crude oil export duty above that which would accrue at on oil price of $27/bbl (Urals) is automatically transferred to the Fund. Until the Fund accumulates a total of RUB 500 billion, Stabilisation Fund may be spend only to finance the federal deficit arising as a result of oil prices below the cut-off price of $27 for Urals crude(OECD, 2006,Ch 2).
average 6.5% in 1990-2006 (Figure 14) , while it was 3.1% in 1971 -1980 and 4.7% in 1981 -1990 (Ariff and Khalid, 2005 . Although India still has an enormous lack of infra-structure, investment rate has increased from around 22% in the first half of the 1990s to around 24% during the 2000s (Table 3) . This good economic performance has been the result, among other factors, of the enormous potential of its domestic consumer market, the existence of a segment of well-qualified workers, the strong productivity growth (more than 3.5% over the course of the 1990s), the management of a well- 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Compared to other countries that adopted floating exchange regime, the volatility of nominal exchange rate has been lower in India (IMF, 2001, p.152) .
Exchange rate has been used in India, combined with other extra-exchange rate tools, to absorb external shocks. As a general trend, nominal exchange rate has been gradually devaluated since 1996 (Figure 15 and 16). Real effective exchange rate has been most time stable, while recently there is a gradual appreciation trend. Indeed, during the 1990s RBI followed a PPP rule whereby the nominal exchange rate was indexed to the price level to target the real exchange rate (Kohli, 2005, p.153) . Since the end of the 1990s, exchange rate policy has begun to change a little the course, shifting from stabilizing the exchange rate towards a more flexible rate regime with no fixed target, but still concerned in curbing excessive volatility and calibrating temporary mismatches in the demand and supply of foreign exchange. 1 9 9 0 q 0 1 1 9 9 0 q 0 4 1 9 9 1 q 0 3 1 9 9 2 q 0 2 1 9 9 3 q 0 1 1 9 9 3 q 0 4 1 9 9 4 q 0 3 1 9 9 5 q 0 2 1 9 9 6 q 0 1 1 9 9 6 q 0 4 1 9 9 7 q 0 3 1 9 9 8 q 0 2 1 9 9 9 q 0 1 1 9 9 9 q 0 4 2 0 0 0 that interest rates offered to these deposits were gradually aligned with international rates, and RBI has no longer underwritten the exchange rate risk (Nayyar, 2002) .
Capital controls in India have been well-designed and clearly effective in limiting measured capital flows. There has been a predominance of quantitative capital controls rather than market based, administratively enforced, and clearly demarcating the distinction between resident (with more strict controls) and non-resident transactions. On the other hand, there are more extensive controls on capital outflows and considerable liberalisation on capital inflows. In particular, capital outflows related to residents are more limited: while they are very restricted to individuals, for domestic firms capital outflows are possible within some limits stipulated by the government.
More recently, restrictions on individuals and domestic corporates have been loosened to allow investments abroad. 22 Capital controls in India have also been dynamic, that is government tends to tight capital controls on outflows during speculative periods and to loose them after that (Epstein et al, 2003, p.30) .
Due mainly to the increase of foreign exchange reserves and the limits to accumulation of foreign debt (mostly short-term ones), most external vulnerability indicators show a remarkable and continuous improvement since 1991: the ratio current account over GDP has been below to -2.0%, and since 2001 the ratio has been positive, due mainly to the increase of services and income and current transfers 23 . Although the traditional external solvency indicator (external debt over exports) has gradually increased during the 1990s, the external indebtedness declined markedly, from a peak of 38% of GDP in 1992 to less than 25% in 1996, while the ratio income debt over exports declined sharply in the first-middle of the 1990s. Furthermore, since 1993 the share of the long-term debt on the total external debt has been more than 90% -a clear evidence that the reorientation of capital account policy toward non-debt creating inflows and FDI since 1991 succeeded. Finally, the international reserves-to-imports ratio increased to more than 100% by 2002 compared to less than 40% in the beginning of the 1990s.
Indeed international reserves rose from US$ 30.2 billion in 1998 to US$ 136.9 billion in 2005 -an increase of 453% in just seven years -due to a more aggressive RBI's exchange reserve accumulation policy (Table 3) . Summing up, the improvement of external vulnerability indexes in India resulted mainly from the low current account deficit, a declining external debt and the increasing level of foreign reserves. 22 For instance, mutual funds in India are now permitted to invest up to US$ 1 billion abroad. 23 India has had an increasing trade deficit due to the imports growth higher than exports growth. Although India has managed to diversify its exports towards higher value added goods, the country's export performance has lagged that of Asia of its share of global exports remains low (IMF, 2006b,Ch II). The nature and the pace of capital account liberalisation exercised an influence on the dimensions and the composition of the private foreign capital inflows to, and outflows from, India -a shift from debt creating to non-debt creating capital flows (Figure 17 ). Capital flows has raised a great deal along the 1990s, followed by a sharp change in their composition: until 1993 there was a predominance of other investments (that include, among others item, non-resident Indian deposits -NRI and foreign loans) while other types of capital flows were almost non-existent; since 1994 capital flows have raised and diversified due the increase of portfolio investments, other investments and foreign direct investment. However, financial integration of the India economy into international capital markets has been still slow and limited: FDI has been increasing during 1990s, but it is low compared to other 'big' emerging countries; according to IMF (2005, p.20) , the ratio FDI over GDP in 2002 was 3.7% in China, 3.1% in Brazil, 2.1% in Mexico and only 0.6% in India. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 Due to the adoption of a managed floating exchange regime, that has resulted in a stable nominal exchange rate, domestic interest rate has had a more unstable behaviour, probably because interest rate has been used as a tool to stabilize nominal exchange rate and also due to non-sterilized operations related to foreign exchange accumulation policy. Figure 18 shows that there is a remarkable declining trend of interest rate in India after the adoption of the managed floating exchange rate regime in 1993 and the steady reduction of the cash reserves requirement since 1991. Such interest rate reduction has stimulated credit expansion under a market based credit system. It seems that in India capital controls have been used not only to reduce external vulnerability and to avoid currency crises, but also to drive a wedge between domestic and external interest rates in order to provide RBI discretion to achieve some monetary policy autonomy.
Finally, concerning the inflation, there is a general declining trend of the consumer prices index, for which the combination between trade liberalisation with (the more recent) exchange rate appreciation has contributed somehow. Fiscal deficit has been high (Table 3) , that is higher than 4.0% of GDP (but declining more recently), and public debt has also been very high (more than 80% of the GDP); however, it is mostly domestic, denominated in rupee and with predominance of long-term debt (IMF, 2005a) . Inflation increased in two moments, during the balance-of-payments crisis of 1991 and during 1997 Asian crisis (Figure 19 ). It should be stressed that inflation rate has been reduced while domestic interest rate has also declined. 1 9 9 0 q 0 1 1 9 9 0 q 0 4 1 9 9 1 q 0 3 1 9 9 2 q 0 2 1 9 9 3 q 0 1 1 9 9 3 q 0 4 1 9 9 4 q 0 3 1 9 9 5 q 0 2 1 9 9 6 q 0 1 1 9 9 6 q 0 4 1 9 9 7 q 0 3 1 9 9 8 q 0 2 1 9 9 9 q 0 1 1 9 9 9 q 0 4 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 FDIs were welcome, but to be highly regulated; after 1986 China granted permission for the operation of wholly owned foreign enterprises (Haihong, 2000, p.19-20) . Major changes in the functioning of the economy were introduced in the 1990s, such as encouragement of foreign investment, reduction of effective tariffs on imported inputs 24 , the modernization of the public corporations, the abolition of multiple exchange rates, and the introduction of convertibility for current account transactions.
24 Average import customs duty was reduced from 45% in 1992 to 17.5% in 2000 (Ariff and Khalid, 2005, p.88) . Since the end of the 1970s, exchange rate regime has changed sometimes: firstly it was centralized and still a fixed one; from 1986 to 1993 the exchange rate was dual, where the official rate, that was subject to periodic adjustments, coexisted with the market-determined rate in the swap centres 25 -the second rate was set at a relatively depreciated level as compared to the official rate. In 1994, the official rate was devaluated and unified with the exchange rate at the swap centres, and a managed floating exchange regime was officially adopted. In practice, however, after short period of some appreciation of nominal exchange rate, the renminbi (RMB), the domestic currency, also known as yuan, was de facto fixed to the U.S. dollar since 1995 ( Figure   19 ). Central bank's intervention to maintain a stable exchange rate has been large scale, with reserves rising to more than 30% of GDP by end 2004. In July 2005, the Chinese authorities announced a revaluation of the exchange rate against the dollar of 2.1%, with the currency able to move daily in a narrow range of ± 0.3%. 26 In addition, the central rate for the RMB is determined by a basket of currencies the composition of which was not revealed. Again, in practice it has not resulted in greater changes in the modus operandi of Chinese exchange rate policy. 25 In the swap centres, exporters, importers, and other parties with foreign exchange supply or needs could transact at a market-determined exchange rate. By 1991, all residents were allowed to sell foreign exchange at the swap rate at the designed bank branches. In December 1998 swap centres were closed and all exchange payments were bought into the banking settlement system. 26 In May 2007 the range was enlarged to ± 0.5%. 250   1986q01  1987q01  1988q01  1989q01  1990q01  1991q01  1992q01  1993q01  1994q01  1995q01  1996q01  1997q01  1998q01  1999q01  2000q01  2001q01  2002q01  2003q01  2004q01  2005q01 Nominal effective exchange rate Real effective exchange rate 1 9 8 5 q 0 1 1 9 8 6 q 0 2 1 9 8 7 q 0 3 1 9 8 8 q 0 4 1 9 9 0 q 0 1 1 9 9 1 q 0 2 1 9 9 2 q 0 3 1 9 9 3 q 0 4 1 9 9 5 q 0 1 1 9 9 6 q 0 2 1 9 9 7 q 0 3 1 9 9 8 q 0 external risks : (iv) maintaining balance of payments equilibrium and keeping exchange rate stability; and (iv) to insulate the economy from foreign financial crises (Zhao, 2006, p.8) . Indeed, China has followed a pattern of financial liberalisation in which sequence starts with liberalising the trade account, then relaxing foreign exchange restrictions, then the long term capital account, and finally the short term capital account (Epstein et al, 2005, p.33-4) .
In 1996 China accepted the IMF Article VII, that resulted in the liberalisation of foreign exchange controls related to current account transactions. Furthermore, since then controls over inflows and outflows by non-residents have been loosened, while maintaining strict but porous controls on inflows and outflows by residents. In fact, at the end of 1996 there were a lot of controls on foreign exchange transactions: (i) nonresidents were forbidden to operate in the money market, stock market and derivative market; they could only buy some sort of shares; (ii) residents could only operate in these markets abroad with previous approval of the monetary authorities, while in some operations there were quantitative restrictions; (iii) prior approval was required for any foreign borrowing, foreign currency-denominated bond issues, and guarantees in foreign exchange (Haihong, 2000) . Therefore, portfolio capitals were not welcome due to segregation between residents and non-residents in the stock markets, while restrictions on other types of external loans were pervasive and generally subject to strict ceilings -controls on foreign debt accumulation prevented the excessive accumulation of foreign debt by residents, controls on equity inflows prevented a speculative bubble in the stock market, while controls on outflows in general prevented devastating surges of capital flight.
It should be stressed the dynamic nature of the controls in China, with the authorities tightening enforcement during crisis periods and then loosening them when the crisis subsides (Epstein et al, 2005, p.35) . As can be seen in Table 4 and Figure The current level of exchange rate is considered in general devaluated. The real effective exchange rate, based on the consumer prices index, had a lot of variations during the last 25 years: it depreciated sharply during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, due to frequent nominal exchange rate devaluations, and it appreciated for a short period until 1997, due to the increase in the inflation. Indeed, RMB was 28 Liberalisation of cross-border foreign exchange transactions include: authorization for purchase of foreign exchange for investments abroad in strategic projects (2001); introduction of the Qualified Foreign Investor Initiative (QFII) permitting non-residents to invest in the domestic stock market (A shares), subject to some restrictions (2002); registration with the government to repay loan principal is no longer required for residents wishing to borrow foreign exchange from domestic Chinese financial institutions (2003); the ceilings on resident's of foreign exchange for purposes of tourism and overseas study were raised from US$ 2000 to US$ 3000 or US$ 5000 (2003) . See more in Prasad et al(2005) .
devaluated by 21% in 1989, 9% in 1990, and 14% in 1994 . Since 1997 real effective exchange rate has had a stable trend, due to both very low inflation and the stable nominal exchange rate (Figure 21 ). The dramatic process of foreign reserves accumulation in China -reaching more than US$ 800 billion in 2005 (Table 4) Chinese economy (and increasing exports performance) and also by the fact the since the beginning of the reforms China sought to attract FDI. Foreign loans, however, had a low growth in the period, what is the result in great extension of the existence of restrictions on foreign debt. Therefore, at the same time that China has sought to attract FDI, it also has been very cautious about foreign loans and portfolio investments, although more recently such capital inflows have increased markedly, notably portfolio investments and other investments, such as loans, currency and deposits. The pick up in export growth since 1995 came as a result of a set of factors, such as liberalisation of the exports licensing system, the increasing productivity of the industry, the cheap wages and the fall in the effective exchange rate. Overall, the current account surplus rose to more than 3% of GDP since 2004 (Table 4 ). 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 Further, the long-term debt over total external debt ratio had been higher than 70% until 2000, an evidence that the maturity structure of the debt is very healthy; more recently the ratio has declined due to the increase of external indebtedness, including short-term ones. Other indexes show additional evidences of a very good external situation: the external debt to exports ratio declined to less than 50% in 2003, while reserve-to-imports ratio increased of 47% on average in 1990-95 to 102% in 1997 (Table 4) .
After a short period of high inflation and high interest rates in the mid-1990s, China has experienced low domestic rates and declining inflation and eventually even deflation (Figures 24 and 25) . The combination of a stable exchange rate (and even a real appreciation in 1994-98), strong labour productivity growth (as a result of strong investment rates), trade liberalisation and declining commodity prices exerted significant downward pressures in inflation in 1996-2002, while demand factors played a smaller role (Prasad et al, 2004, p.14) . The reduction in the inflation has been followed by expansionist monetary and fiscal policies in the period. China's fiscal position has been healthy due to the strong economic growth and low domestic interest rates, despite the fact that primary fiscal position may appear weaker (Prasad et al, 2004, ch.V) . More recently fiscal deficit over GDP has declined to 1.2% in 2005. The
Chinese authorities have attempted to isolate the domestic economy from the consequences of the combination of a fixed exchange rate and large capital inflows through sterilisation. The sterilisation of capital inflows has been facilitated by the fact that domestic interest rates have been lower than interest rates of industrial country treasury bonds (Prasad et al, 2005, p.12) . 1 9 9 0 q 0 1 1 9 9 0 q 0 4 1 9 9 1 q 0 3 1 9 9 2 q 0 2 1 9 9 3 q 0 1 1 9 9 3 q 0 4 1 9 9 4 q 0 3 1 9 9 5 q 0 2 1 9 9 6 q 0 1 1 9 9 6 q 0 4 1 9 9 7 q 0 3 1 9 9 8 q 0 2 1 9 9 9 q 0 1 1 9 9 9 q 0 4 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
Source: IMF/International Financial Statistics
Conclusion
China and India, managing their exchange rate regimes with a restrictive capital account convertibility, have been succeed cases of management of macroeconomic policy -in which the stability of exchange rate has a crucial role -that seek to create a stability environment for economic growth. China and India's cases show how is correct to implement a gradual and careful management of capital account and policies oriented towards the reduction of external vulnerability. These experiences also show that capital controls can be helpful in protecting the economy against the destabilising aspects of capital flows and helping to resolve certain types of policy dilemma, such as simultaneously managing exchange rate and the short term interest rate.
Russia is an interesting case, as the economy until 1998 performed very bad, as a result of a chaotic transition process of liberalisation to a market economy; after the 1998 crisis the economy has performed very well, due to both the increase in the exports (mainly related to oil and gas) and the better management of macroeconomic policy, that has combined a more active exchange rate policy and decreasing interest rates, under a context (at least until recently) of a partial capital account convertibility.
Brazil, on the other hand, has adopted a more liberal and orthodox economic policy, that includes a less interventionist approach related to exchange rate policy and a very open capital account, that has resulted in higher exchange rate volatility, higher interest rates, and a more poor economic performance. Table 5 shows a comparative synthesis of the analysis of the macroeconomic policy of each BRIC country. Among different factors that are important to the management of macroeconomic policy, this paper stressed in particular the importance of reducing external vulnerability, that should be understood not only in terms of the external solvency of the country, but also in terms of its vulnerability to external shocks and changes in the market sentiment, in which the lower or higher degree of capital convertibility can be a essential factor. In this particular concern, the recent experience 
